I spoke at a meeting recently, about the book, Thirteen Hours The Inside Account Of What Really Happened In Benghazi. There was much interest and I had planned on live-streaming. However, we were unable to live-stream in the building.
Because of the interest of so many, I am high-lighting some of the main points of my talk (attacks and requests for help that took place in Benghazi in 2012 leading up to, and including 9-11-12.)
What I share comes solely from the book written by Mitchell Zuckoff with the Annex Security Team (these are the guys who were there and I believe their account is accurate.)
Benghazi -
2011 Civil War in Benghazi with help from America, brought to end the rule of Gaddafi. After the war the absence of a working government, anti-Western sentiments, and an ample
supply of weapons (raided from Gaddafi's armories, were thousands of AK-47s, pistols, assault rifles, grenades, mortars, rocket launchers and heavy machine guns that were then sold in markets and out of the trunks of vehicles) led to more and more violence
in 2012.
2012 attacks in Benghazi -
April 2, British armored vehicle attacked.
April 6 homemade bomb was thrown over a wall at the
US Special Mission Compound
April 10-another homemade bomb was lobbed at motorcade
of UN Special Envoy to Libya
May- RPG (rocket propelled grenade) struck Benghazi
offices of the International committee of the Red Cross.
June 6 - attacks escalate IED (improvised explosive
device) blew a hole in a wall around the US diplomatic Compound
June 11 - RPG fired at a car carrying the British
ambassador (1/2 mile from US Diplomatic Compound. The next day, the UK closed
Benghazi consulate and evacuated its staffers.)
Early 2012 - J. Christopher Stevens became Ambassador who believed, "There is tremendous goodwill for the United States in Libya
now." He arrived in Libya, May 26, 2012. His optimism was tested from the start by instability
and violence.
Note - Two main buildings will be mentioned -1) The Annex where the CIA was and where GRS operators were. The GRS operators were former military (mostly special ops) independent contractors hired to guard diplomats and Americans in the field) - 2) The US Special Mission Compound where Ambassador Chris Stevens stayed and where DS Agents (law enforcement and security arm of State Department) were hired to safeguard the Secretary of State and visiting dignitaries.
Requests for protection -
Early June, 2012 - Ambassador Stevens sent an e-mail to State
Department official in Washington asking for two six-man Mobile Security
Detachments of specially trained DS agents be allowed to remain in Libya
through the nations elections in July and August. "We would feel much safer
if we could keep two MSD teams with us through this period to support our staff
and provide a personal detail for me and the Deputy Chief of Mission and any VIP
visitors." The request was denied.
June 25 - Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens sent a cable to Washington quoting local sources who said, "Islamic extremism" appeared to be rising in eastern Libya -al-Quaeda's black and white flag has been spotted flying over government buildings."
July 9, 2012 - Ambassador Stevens and embassy's security staff,
led by a DS agent (Eric Nordstrom) asked the State Department to extend the
presence of a Site Security Team (SST) consisting of sixteen active-duty military
special operators. The State Department officials denied the request saying the
DS agents and local hired guards could do the job. (The Defense Department's
African Command which oversaw the unit (SST) was willing to extend their stay
and offered twice. However, Ambassador Stevens would not buck the decision of
the State Department in Washington.)
August 2012 - The State Department issued a severely
worded travel warning for Libya, cautioning that "political violence in
the form of assassinations and vehicle bombs has increased in both Benghazi and
Tripoli....Inter-militia conflict can erupt at any time or any place in the
country."
August 2, 2012 - Stevens sent another cable to Washington seeking more body guards. He wrote, "The security conditions in Libya - unpredictable, volatile and violent." Request denied.
As the anniversary of 9-11 approached, which also
coincided with the Ambassador's visit to Benghazi, there was a warning that GRS
operators felt certain came from Washington - the cable warned: Be advised, we
have reports from locals that a Western facility or US
Embassy/Consulate/Government target will be attacked in the next week. (wording
may not be exact but the unambiguous message was clear.)
September 6, 2012 - Stevens wrote in his diary,
"Militias are power on the ground. Dicey conditions, including car bombs,
attacks on consulate, Islamist 'hit list' in Benghazi. Me targeted on a
prominent website..."
September 10, 2012 - Stevens arrives in Benghazi from
Tripoli for a ribbon cutting ceremony at a local school. He has two DS agents to guard him. Three others are already stationed at the Special Missions Compound. In addition to the seven Americans, were four members of the 17 February militia who lived near the front of the compound. One of the members had been absent for several days. the guards trustworthiness was questionable since the Compound "had been vandalized and attacked...by some of the same guards who were there to protect it."
Evening September 10, 2012 - a private meeting with Benghazi's mayor and city council was to take place. However, the local media was contacted - making a larger security threat. A DS agent called the Annex team for backup (note: the 17 February militia hired to do backup had refused to accompany the American diplomat's vehicle in protest. Even so, US officials still officially considered the 17February Martyr's Brigade ie. militia (large Islamist militia) to be a quick Reaction Force in event of an attack on the Compound.) Since militia refused to protect the ambassador, Tyrone Woods and Jack Silva (both GRS operators and former Navy SEALS) volunteered to accompany him.
September 11, 2012
Benghazi wakes at call to Fajr prayer.
6:43am Three men in a car slow to a stop north side of US diplomatic Compound. A man climbed to the second floor of a building that overlooked the Compound, recording what he saw on his phone camera. A guard spotted the photographer and went out to speak with him. The man denied doing anything wrong, got in the car and they all left. Stevens issued a complaint delivered to police authorities about the incident. No word back.
Quiet day
7:40 pm Stevens and a DS agent escort Turkish Consul General outside the main gate.
9:00 pm Annex team and Americans at Compound settle in for the night.
9:02 pm vehicle parks outside the main Compound gate for forty minutes, never engaging with
anyone - guards nor anyone from Compound.
The moment the vehicle drives away shots and an explosion rang out. Several dozen men firing AK-47s swarmed through the pedestrian entrance of the Compound's main gate. Guards who were to sound an alarm to alert DS agents, and serve as first line defense had been a huge mistake because they didn't do either. Instead they ran to find better trained DS agents...some ran and left the Compound. Attackers met no resistance and took control. They found five-gallon fuel cans and poured diesel fuel around the building, setting it on fire.
9:45 pm chief DS agent at US Embassy in Tripoli announces the Compound was under attack.
-The two DS agents inside the TOC called the US Embassy in Tripoli, the CIA Annex, headquarters of the 17 February militia and the Diplomatic Security Command Center in Washington.
-Within minutes of the attack, the seven Americans were separated into three locations - Two Benghazi-based DS agents were locked inside the TOC (a separate building from the Compound) two DS agents were barricaded inside the Cantina with a local guard, and Ambassador Chris Stevens and Sean Smith, and DS agent were left in the villa's safe haven (a 'secret' place for safety in the Compound.) With flames surrounding the building, and toxic smoke, it was not a safe place. Armed invaders made their way around the Compound firing their weapons and destroying and stealing whatever they liked.
- Two way radios throughout Annex announced a meeting of all GRS to let them know the Compound was under attack.
- From the US Embassy in Tripoli, Deputy Chief of Mission Gregory Hicks called the Operations Center at the State Department in Washington to report the attack. Calls went out to several Libyan political leaders as well.
- the embassy's defense attaché called leaders of Libya's Air Force and other Libyan armed forces seeking help. Calls were made to officials at Benina International Airport to ask for logistical support and cooperation in anticipation of arrival of American operators from Tripoli (including former Navy SEAL Glen Doherty.)
-calls went out from American diplomats to leaders of the 17 February militia, officials at the UN, and diplomats in friendly nations' embassies in Libya.
- Hicks called Washington again with updates.
10:05 pm (4:05pm in Washington) the State Dept. Operations Cener issued an alert to the White House Situation Room, the FBI and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, among other government and intel agencies. "US Diplomatic Mission in Benghazi Under Attack. Approximately twenty armed people fired shots; explosions have been heard as well...."
GRS operators prepare to assist at Compound. Bob the base chief says to wait for his signal.
GRS operators again say, "We've gotta go!" Bob the base chief tells them to stand down. They need to wait.
GRS operators continue to say they need to go. The base chief continues to tell them to wait..'the local militia will handle it.'
DS agent radios about attack and base chief continues to tell GRS operators to stand down.
Being used to following orders GRS operators wait, but know they can't wait anymore.
GRS operators leave and drive to Compound.
In the meantime, DS agent Alec Henderson continued to communicate with the Tripoli embassy, the State Dept. in Washington.
Washington - Defense Secretary Leon Panetta later testified to Congress that two Marine security platoons stationed in Spain were ordered to prepare to go - a Special Operations force in central Europe was ordered to prepare to deploy, a US-based Special Operations team was told to get ready - consideration to send armed aircraft was decided against, Panetta said because of, "a problem of distance and time."
Hicks who was in Tripoli had been communicating with Washington, and had asked if any help was coming, and was told the nearest help was in Italy where Air Force fighter planes were two/three hours away but they'd need refueling and no tankers were available right then.
In the end, none of them were sent to Benghazi.
However, the GRS team from Tripoli was sent to Benghazi to help.
GRS operators enter the Compound, looking for Ambassador Stevens in the midst of the fire, to no avail.
The Americans are confronted over and over with firefights - one group of attackers would leave, there may be a lull, and another group would come, eventually, launching mortar after mortar.
Those who lost their lives -Tyrone Woods (former Navy SEAL) and Glen Doherty (former Navy SEAL) as well as Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and Sean Smith (computer specialist.)
Sunrise September 12, 2012
6:22 am in Benghazi Surviving Americans prepared to leave.
This is the end of a summary of the events in Benghazi 2012, taken from the book, Thirteen Hours The Inside Account Of What Really Happened In Benghazi. There are many more details in the book told by the men who were there...more of their first hand accounts of what actually happened. I urge you as a reader to read this book.
In light of media coverage, and the idea that the "surprise, out-of-nowhere-attack" was "...because of a protest or because of guys out for a walk last night who decided to kill some Americans?" I wanted to read, research on my own. As I stated at the beginning, I believe the accounts given by the men who were there.
From all accounts written here- the timeline, the number of attacks and requests, could any or all of these attacks been prevented?
You decide.
Benghazi happened.
Benghazi matters.
